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WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE AND DISCOVERY OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY: RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
26(b)(3) AND 26(b)(4)
JAN W. HENKEL* AND 0. LEE REED**
When an attorney furnishes documents containing work product to
an expert witness, a potential conflict arises between the work
product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3) and the expert discovery
provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). In this Article, Professors Henkel and
Reed examine the approaches federal courts have taken to this
conflict. They argue that any approach which either allows for the
discovery of documents containing work product or allows for the
discovery of documents from which work product has been
expunged is contrary to the purposes of the federal rules. The
authors then propose a solution to this conflict which protects both
the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3) and the expert discovery
provisions of Rule 26(b)(4).
WHILE courts generally permit a very broad scope of discovery
V in federal cases, this liberal construction is not without several
important exceptions. One such exception, Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 26(b)(3), protects an attorney's "wits," opinions, mental im-
pressions, conclusions, theories, and other work product from
disclosure to adversaries. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4), on
the other hand, encourages liberal discovery of experts' opinions and
tle facts upon which those opinions are based. Courts occasionally
require experts to disclose documents relied upon in formulating their
expert opinions. A potential conflict between these two federal rules
arises when attorney work product, which is generally protected from
discovery by Rule 26(b)(3), is shown to an expert witness in prepara-
tion for a trial. As attorney work product, such material is protected
from discovery by Rule 26(b)(3), but insofar as such material was re-
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lied upon by an expert in formulating an opinion, it seems discover-
able under Rule 26(b)(4).
During the past decade, the testimony of expert witnesses has be-
come an integral part of most types of complex litigation. Expert wit-
nesses typically draw upon their knowledge and experience in a given
field to render an opinion concerning the facts of a particular case.
Counsel for a party involved in the litigation may then use this opin-
ion to establish or reinforce the client's position. In order to facilitate
the formulation of an expert opinion, counsel often furnishes docu-
ments and other evidentiary materials to the expert witness which de-
tail the facts of the litigation in question. Counsel may also provide an
expert with memoranda which outline legal issues and relevant law for
the case.
Documents and memoranda which are prepared by an attorney in
anticipation of litigation and which contain the mental impressions
and legal theories of that attorney have traditionally been protected by
the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.1 Attorneys who frequently retain expert witnesses
must be aware, however, that under Rule 26(b)(4), 2 they may inadver-
tently forfeit this work product immunity if they furnish work prod-
uct material to an expert witness to aid that expert in formulating an
opinion.
Currently, a conflict exists in the federal courts over whether the
discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) supercede the work product pro-
1. Rule 26(b)(3) states:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party may obtain dis-
covery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision
(b)(l) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for an-
other party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other party's
attorney . . .) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials . . . the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
2. Rule 26(b)(4) states:
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable un-
der the provisions of subdivision (b)(l) of this rule and acquired or developed in antic-
ipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each
person whom the other expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject
matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the
facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the
grounds for each opinion.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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tection of Rule 26(b)(3) when material containing attorney work prod-
uct has been used by an expert witness in the formulation of an
opinion. Until the federal judiciary reaches a firm conclusion regard-
ing the primacy of these two rules, attorneys who retain expert wit-
nesses should realize the possibility that any information given to an
expert witness, regardless of its work product nature, might be ex-
posed to the opposing counsel under discovery sanctioned by Rule
26(b)(4).
This Article will review the basis and scope of both Rule 26(b)(3)
and Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It will then
present an overview of federal decisions which have dealt with the
conflict between the provisions of these two rules. Finally, the authors
will propose a judicial standard which will allow attorneys to retain
and prepare expert witnesses and remain substantially certain as to
which materials will ultimately become discoverable under Rule
26(b)(4) as a result of their use in expert preparation.
I. WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY
The work product doctrine severely limits an opposing counsel's
discovery of certain material which has been prepared by attorneys in
anticipation of litigation. Although the current work product doctrine
is codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the doctrine has its roots in the 1947 Supreme Court decision of Hick-
man v. Taylor.'
The Hickman decision involved a wrongful death action which
arose when five crewmembers died as a result of the sinking of a tug-
boat.4 The defendant tugboat owner's lead counsel interviewed the
surviving crew members in preparation for possible litigation.' The in-
terviewing attorney sought to protect the notes and memoranda taken
during these interviews from discovery by the plaintiff on the ground
that they contained his thoughts and mental impressions. 6 The Su-
preme Court upheld the attorney's refusal to answer plaintiff's inter-
rogatories and release the interview memoranda. 7 The Court noted
that an attorney must have a degree of privacy to assemble, delineate
and prepare adequately his client's case, reasoning that if the thoughts
and mental impressions of an attorney were subject to discovery, the
3. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
4. Id. at 498.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 499.
7. Id. at 514.
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legal profession would be demoralized, and the ends of justice would
not be adequately served.'
The Hickman decision also made it clear that the discovery immu-
nity created by the work product doctrine was not absolute. 9 An attor-
ney's files may be so essential to the other party's preparation that
discovery of material containing work product may be ordered. 0
However, the party seeking to discover work product must provide
adequate reasons to justify removing the protection of work product
immunity."
The work product doctrine set forward by Hickman was applied
inconsistently by the federal judiciary in subsequent decisions.' 2 As a
result, the 1970 Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure
proposed and the Supreme Court adopted an amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure that codified the work product doctrine
and helped specify exactly which materials constitute work product."
As currently codified, Rule 26(b)(3) provides a qualified immunity
from discovery to materials which meet each of three basic require-
ments. First, the work product immunity extends only to "documents
and tangible things."'' 4 While the facts contained in an attorney's
work product may be discoverable, 5 the actual work documents are
generally protected under the Rule 26(b)(3) immunity.' 6
8. Id. at 511.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Court stated:
[Tihe general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of prepara-
tion is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal
procedure that a burden rests on one who would invade that privacy to establish ade-
quate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order.
Id. at 512.
12. For instance, courts have differed on whether the work product immunity extended to
work performed by nonlawyers. Compare Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950) (work product immunity applied to statements obtained
by FBI agents) with Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962) (work product
immunity not applicable to statements obtained by claim agent). See also FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment); Annotation, Development, Since Hick-
man v. Taylor, of Attorney's "Work Product" Doctrine, 35 A.L.R. 3d 412 (1971).
13. See FED. R. Cwv. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
14. FED. R. Cw. P. 26(b)(3).
15. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2023, at 194 (1970)
[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
The courts have consistently held that the work product concept furnishes no shield
against discovery, by interrogatories or by deposition, of the facts that the adverse
party's lawyer has learned, or the persons from whom he has learned such facts, or
the existence or nonexistence of documents, even though the documents themselves
may not be subject to discovery.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16. FED. R. Cir. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
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Second, in order to be protected by work product immunity a docu-
ment must have been "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial.""7 Thus, when documents are prepared after a potential cause of
action arises, they are considered work product, even if actual litiga-
tion has not yet commenced. Documents which are prepared in the
normal course of business, however, are not accorded work product
immunity."8
Finally, work product immunity extends only to materials prepared
"by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative
(including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
insurer or agent)."' 9 The advisory committee notes for the 1970
amendment to Rule 26(b)(3) recognize that the rule should be inter-
preted to continue the judicial trend of extending work product immu-
nity to materials prepared "by or for a party or any representative
acting on [the party's] behalf. ' 20
Rule 26(b)(3) sets forth a qualified immunity; parties seeking dis-
covery may overcome the work product protection and obtain discov-
ery of work product materials upon meeting two requirements. First,
parties seeking discovery must demonstrate a substantial need for the
documents. 21 Case precedent construing this requirement indicates
that parties seeking discovery must show that the material is "essen-
tial" to the preparation of the party's case or a "necessity" for ade-
quate trial preparation. 2
Second, parties seeking discovery of work product must show that
they are "unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the materials by other means. ' 23 The advisory commit-
tee notes for Rule 26(b)(3) direct trial courts to consider the facts and
holdings of prior case law when determining whether a party seeking
discovery has adequately demonstrated "undue hardship."24
Even though Rule 26(b)(3) allows limited discovery of work prod-
uct, the thoughts and mental impressions of an attorney are to be
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
18. Id. advisory committee's note (1970 amendment); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v.
Perrigan, 102 F.R.D. 235, 238-39 (W.D. Va. 1984); Chaney ex rel. Guilliam v. Slack, 99 F.R.D.
531, 533 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Westhemeco Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 702, 708
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D.
397, 402 (E.D. Va. 1975); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 2024, at 198-99.
19. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3).
20. Id. advisory committee's note (1970 amendment) (emphasis added).
21. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(3).
22. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 n.19 (8th Cir. 1977); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686,
693 (10th Cir. 1968); LSB Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 556 F. Supp. 40, 45 (W.D. Okla. 1982);
Annotation, supra note 12, at 465-69. See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, at § 2025 n.66.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
24. Id. advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
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given an exceptional level of protection.25 Decisions subsequent to the
1970 amendment of Rule 26(b)(3) indicate that a party seeking to dis-
cover material which contains an attorney's thoughts and mental im-
pressions must meet a higher standard of justification than a party
who merely seeks to discover facts contained within an attorney's
work product. 26 Indeed, some courts have held that the thoughts and
mental impressions of an attorney are to be held inviolate, and an
opposing party cannot offer evidence of circumstances which would
be sufficient to compel discovery of work product containing such im-
pressions .27
Rule 26(b)(3) seems to offer almost total protection to interoffice
memoranda and organized material evidence which would tend to re-
flect an attorney's legal theories or potential arguments regarding a
given case. 2 Rule 26(b)(4), however, sanctions the discovery of the
grounds for an expert witness' opinion. When the grounds for an ex-
pert's opinion include memoranda containing an attorney's thoughts,
mental impressions and legal theories, Rule 26(b)(4) discovery comes
into direct conflict with Rule 26(b)(3) protection.
II. DISCOVERY OF THE INFORMATION UNDERLYING AN EXPERT
WITNESS' OPINION
Rule 26(b)(4) codifies specific provisions regarding the discovery of
facts known and opinions held by experts retained by a party to a
specific case. 29 The rule provides a much broader scope of discovery
against experts who a party expects to call as trial witnesses than
against experts who have been formally retained in anticipation of liti-
gation but will not be called as trial witnesses.3 0
If a party expects to call an expert for trial testimony (or for deposi-
tion testimony which will be admissible at trial), Rule 26(b)(4) allows
25. Joyner v. Continental Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 414, 415 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Carver v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 133 (S.D. Ga. 1982); United States v. Catham City Corp., 72 F.R.D.
640, 643 n.3 (S.D. Ga. 1976).
26. See Al Rowaishan Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods
Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); International Tel. and Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co.,
60 F.R.D. 177, 187 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
27. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973); Carey-Canada,
Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 118 F.R.D. 242, 249 (D.D.C. 1986).
28. Miller v. Haulmark Transp. Sys., 104 F.R.D. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Neugebauer v.
A.S. Abell Co., 77 F.R.D. 712, 714 (D. Md. 1978).
29. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4).
30. See Eliasen v. Hamilton, 111 F.R.D. 396, 398-403 (N.D. Il1. 1986); Heitmann v. Con-
crete Pipe Mach., 98 F.R.D. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1983). See also WRIGHT & Mn.LER, supra note 15, §
2032, at 255-56 (citing United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968), in which the
court stated that "it will rarely be possible to make the required showing" in the case of retained
experts who will not testify).
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the discovery of a well-defined spectrum of information. Under Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(i)
[a] party may through interrogatories require any other party to
identify each party whom the other party expects to call as an expert
witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is
expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of
the grounds for each opinion.3
Rule 26(b)(4) thus establishes that the party retaining the expert must
furnish the names of all experts whom the party intends to call as trial
witnesses.3 2 A failure to answer properly such an interrogatory may
cause the court to exclude the testimony of the unidentified expert."
On motion of counsel the court may order further discovery by
other means. 34 Such procedures for further discovery have been used
to sanction pretrial depositions of another party's expert witness."
Courts have allowed these depositions to be used to acquire informa-
tion for the purposes of cross-examination3 6 and impeachment.
37
These procedures have also been employed to acquire documents con-
taining the grounds for an expert's opinion.3
If an expert has been formally retained by a party as a consultant
but will not be called as a trial witness, discovery of that witness is
permitted "only as provided for in Rule 35(b) [regarding examining
physicians] or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means." ' 39 The advisory
committee notes indicate that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) restricts discovery of
31. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
32. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 2030, at 252.
33. See Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 727-28 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding trial
court decision excluding expert testimony); Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 758 F.2d 251, 257-58
(8th Cir. 1985).
34. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
35. Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1983). See also Worley v.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 534, 539 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (allowing defendant to depose
plaintiff's expert).
36. See Keith v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 86 F.R.D. 458 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (defendant's
counsel allowed to depose expert regarding expert's background, education, and experience in
order to prepare for effective cross-examination).
37. See Bockweg v. Anderson, 117 F.R.D. 563 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Norfin, Inc. v. IBM
Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529 (D. Colo. 1977); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
38. See Heitman v. Concrete Pipe Mach., 98 F.R.D. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Quadrini v.
Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977).
39. FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(4)(B). See also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 15, § 2032, at 256.
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nonwitness experts who have been formally retained and precludes
discovery of experts who have been consulted but never formally re-
tained by a party to the litigation. ° This restriction of the discovery of
nonwitness experts implies that the Advisory Committee did not value
this type of discovery as highly as the discovery of expert witnesses.
Because of this lesser need for the discovery of nonwitness experts and
the similar standards between Rule 26(b)(4)(B) and Rule 26(b)(3), it
appears that no conflict arises between the discovery of nonwitness
experts and the work product immunity. 4 1
A party may also submit interrogatories, asking for a summary of
the grounds for the opposing expert's opinions.42 The case law does
not specifically define what constitutes a sufficient summary, but it
indicates that a skeletal summary of the grounds relied upon will be
sufficient to meet the discovery requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A).4
Moreover, in dealing with the requirement restricting this discovery to
"interrogatories," several cases indicate that Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) can-
not be used to compel production of the actual documents which com-
prise the basis of an expert's opinion testimony. 44
If the provisions of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) supercede those of Rule
26(b)(3), attorneys may forfeit work product protection for their
thoughts, legal theories, and mental impressions when they use such
material to prepare expert witnesses. As noted above, attorneys in-
volved in complex litigation may prepare memoranda of law and fur-
nish these memoranda to their expert witnesses to aid the witnesses'
preparation for trial testimony. Such use of attorney work product in
the preparation of expert testimony will bring the provisions of Rule
26(b)(4)(A) into direct conflict with the work product immunity pro-
vided by Rule 26(b)(3).
III. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RULE 26(b)(3)
AND RULE 26(b)(4)
Although the federal judiciary has not extensively dealt with the dis-
covery conflict which arises between Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4), the
40. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
41. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the standard for allowing discovery is one of impracticability of
obtaining the information elsewhere due to "exceptional circumstances." This standard closely
resembles the "undue hardship" requirement of Rule 26(b)(3). Because of this similarity, once a
party has met one standard, they have also met the other standard, and the information becomes
discoverable under either rule. Any conflict, therefore, is moot.
42. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i).
43. See Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 98 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding that a general
reference by the deposed expert to books used in forming opinions is not a "sufficient sum-
mary" when the opposing party requests a specific list of the books relied upon by the expert).
44. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984); Breedlove v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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courts which have addressed this issue have reached different results.
At least one court has followed the reasoning of courts addressing the
conflict between Federal Rule of Evidence 612 and Rule 26(b)(3), con-
cluding that the expert discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) should
prevail over the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3). 45 Still other
courts have upheld the immunity of opinion work product regardless
of its use by or exposure to an expert witness. 46 The approaches taken
in these cases will now be examined.
A. The Analogous Discovery Conflict Between Rule 26(b)(4) and
FRE 612
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 (FRE 612) resembles Rule 26(b)(4) in
that it specifies certain circumstances under which a party is entitled
to the production of written material used by a witness in preparation
for testifying. Specifically, FRE 612 provides:
[11f a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the purpose of
testifying, either-
(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the
hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to
introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of
the witness. 4 7
Such writings often include memoranda prepared by counsel for the
opposing party which contain attorney work product and which
would theoretically be protected under the work product immunity of
Rule 26(b)(3).4 s Any attempt to discover this material under the provi-
sions of FRE 612 would produce a conflict with Rule 26(b)(3)-a con-
flict procedurally similar to the conflict between Rule 26(b)(4) and
Rule 26(b)(3).
45. See Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
46. See Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 587 (3rd Cir. 1984); North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp.
v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 108 F.R.D. 283 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Baise, 99 F.R.D. at 95 (W.D.
Mo. 1983).
47. FED. R. EVID. 612 (emphasis added).
48. However, Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger warn that "[i]n the present state of
uncertainty, attorneys should not refresh prospective deponents or witnesses with material con-
taining counsel's theories or thought processes." 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's
EVIDENCE 612-42 (1987).
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1. Case Law
The cases considering the conflict between FRE 612 and Rule
26(b)(3) have reached different results concerning whether FRE 612
requires disclosure of documents containing opinion work product
protected by Rule 26(b)(3). The leading decision in the area is Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.4 9 The plaintiff photo processor in
Berkey brought an antitrust action against Eastman Kodak, and coun-
sel for the defendant assembled four notebooks of empirical corporate
data which the defendant's expert witnesses were allowed to review.5 0
A magistrate ordered that all expert witnesses be deposed and that all
material given to the experts during their preparation be produced to
opposing counsel pursuant to FRE 612.51 The defendant's counsel re-
fused to produce the four notebooks, asserting that the materials were
protected by Rule 26(b)(3) work product immunity.12
The court in Berkey began its analysis of the scope of work product
immunity with Hickman v. Taylor. 3 The court specifically noted that
work product immunity is a qualified immunity and indicated in dicta
that the immunity could be overcome where counsel "exceeds decent
limits" by attempting to conceal damaging material.14 The court also
stated in dicta that when an attorney has a clear choice between mate-
rials which do contain work product and materials which do not, "the
decision to give the work product to the witness could well be deemed
a waiver of the [work product] privilege." 55
The court in Berkey concluded, again in dicta, that under many cir-
cumstances the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3) should give
way to the discovery provisions of FRE 612.56 In arriving at this con-
clusion, the court neglected to follow the advisory committee notes
for FRE 612 which clearly state that FRE 612 was not intended to bar
the assertion of any privileges applicable to documents used to refresh
an expert witness' memory. 7
49. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
50. Id. at 614.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
54. Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617.
55. Id. at 616.
56. Id. at 617.
57. FED. R. Evm. 612 advisory committee's note. But see S & A Painting Co. v. O.W.B
Corp., 103 F.R.D. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that attorney-client privilege and work product
immunity are waived as to information obtained from notes during testimony). However, S & A
Painting limited the waiver of protection to the "portions of the notes to which reference was
made" during testimony. Id. at 409. See also Note, Interactions Between Memory Refreshment
Doctrine and Work Product Protection Under the Federal Rules, 88 YALE L.J. 390, 400 (1978)
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The court in Berkey reviewed the evidence on the record and deter-
mined that counsel for the defendants had not entered into "a calcu-
lated plan to exploit the work product in a significant way for
preparing the experts while planning to erect the shield of privilege
against discovery. '5 8 Thus, despite its apparent belief that the work
product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3) may be overcome, the court tenta-
tively held that the defendant's notebooks should be granted immu-
nity under the rule.59
In 1982, the United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware adopted the waiver theory suggested by Berkey in James Julian,
Inc. v. Raytheon Co.6° The defendants in this antitrust action sought
production of binders of documents compiled by the plaintiff's coun-
sel and reviewed by the plaintiff's expert witnesses prior to their depo-
sitions.61 The plaintiff's counsel objected to the discovery on the
ground that the organization and selection of specific documents
within the binder constituted the attorney's opinions and thought
processes which should be granted protection from discovery under
Rule 26 (b)(3). 62
Although the court in James Julian agreed that the documents con-
tained opinion work product, 63 the court relied on the dicta of Berkey
to support its conclusion that the discovery provisions of FRE 612
should supercede the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3). 64 The
court acknowledged that each case must be decided on its particular
facts. 65 Its conclusion, however, was clearly buttressed by the dicta of
Berkey, as the court in James Julian stated, "[pjlaintiff's counsel
made a decision to educate their witnesses by supplying them with the
binders, and the Raytheon defendants are entitled to know the content
of that education." 66
("In Berkey, Rule 612 becomes a rule of discovery covering everything shown to a witness prior
to his testimony, whether used to refresh memory or not. As a result, Rule 612 does not remain a
rule of evidence dealing exclusively with memory refreshment.").
58. Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617.
59. Id. Although the court in Berkey reversed the magistrate on this issue, it did so with
reservation stating that its holding was "without any sure conviction that this is an ineluctably
right course." Id.
60. 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
61. Id. at 144.
62. Id.
63. Id. See also Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing James Julian for the
proposition that the selection and ordering of documents could be indicative of the mental pro-
cesses of counsel).
64. James Julian, 93 F.R.D. at 145.
65. Id. at 146.
66. Id.
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However, two recent decisions from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Hartz Mountain Industries, Inc.67 and Al-Rowaishan Establishment
Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods Co.,68 have
both rejected the notion that Rule 26(b)(3) immunity must give way to
FRE 612 discovery. The court concluded in both cases that while the
work product material reviewed by the expert witnesses might be of
some value to the party seeking discovery, this value did not outweigh
the need to uphold the protection afforded by Rule 26(b)(3).6 9 Thus, a
conflict exists on the question whether FRE 612 should prevail over
the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3).
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado, in Boring v. Keller,70 followed the rea-
soning of the courts which held that FRE 612 should prevail over Rule
26(b)(3). Thus, the court concluded that opinion work product is dis-
coverable under Rule 26(b)(4). The conflict in Boring arose in the con-
text of a 1983 medical malpractice action.71 The attorney for the
defendant retained physicians as expert witnesses and inadvertently
sent them an unedited version of a summary of the plaintiff's deposi-
tion.72 The defendant's counsel had also sent a letter to the experts
advising them on the legal issues under consideration in the case. 73
When plaintiff's counsel deposed the first of the defendant's expert
witnesses, he asked the witness to identify all documents which had
been examined in preparation for the deposition and in the formula-
tion of the witness' opinion.7 4 Defendant's counsel agreed, and the
documents were attached to the deposition.75 Only afterward did the
defendant's attorney become aware that the summary of the plain-
tiff's deposition sent to the physician's expert witness contained his
mental impressions and evaluations of the plaintiff's appearance and
demeanor as a witness. Counsel for the defendant then requested per-
67. 553 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
68. 92 F.R.D. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
69. See Carter-Wallace, 553 F. Supp. at 52; AI-Rowaishan, 92 F.R.D. at 781. See also 3 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 612-42 (1987) ("Given the liberality of disclo-
sure and the work-product exception in the discovery rules, the opponent should be required to
make some showing of need in order to obtain materials which a witness reviewed . . . instead of
achieving wholesale disclosure.").
70. 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 405. Although the letter did not discuss specifics, it did contain general impres-
sions and issues generally involved in medical malpractice cases.
74. Id. at 404.
75. Id.
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mission to withdraw the part of the exhibit that contained his mental
impressions on the ground that they constituted work product and
were thus privileged.7 6
The court in Boring held that the opinion work product of an attor-
ney becomes discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4) when an expert witness
utilizes it in formulating his or her opinion. 71 The court relied on Ber-
key, 71 which it interpreted as holding that when an attorney delivers
material to an expert which would be "useful to the client," he may
not withhold the material from an adversary who seeks to exploit the
fact of this assistance in cross-examining the witness.79
The Berkey holding itself is contrary to the proposition for which it
is cited in Boring. The Boring court quoted, almost verbatim, a por-
tion of the Berkey opinion so clearly recognized by the Berkey court
itself as dicta that it segregated it from the rest of the opinion under a
separate heading and prefaced it with a paragraph that makes the
characterization of dicta virtually indisputable.80 Although the Berkey
court expressed a disposition to rule differently in the future, it held
that the plaintiff in the instant case did not have to make the disputed
documents available to the defendant."' Relying on its misapplication
of the Berkey decision, the Boring court affirmed a magistrate's order
compelling the defendant's counsel to produce the deposition sum-
mary in question.82 The court reinforced its decision by observing that
granting the documents the work product protection of Rule 26(b)(3)
would frustrate the purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) by leaving the plaintiff's
attorneys inadequately prepared to cross-examine the defendant's ex-
pert witnesses.8 3
Later in 1983, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Missouri reached a decision in Baise v. Alewel's, Inc.8 4 which sharply
76. Id. at 405.
77. Id. at 407-08.
78, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
79. Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 407.
80. The court in Berkey prefaced the language cited by the court in Boring with the follow-
ing:
A single member of a multi-judge trial bench may verge toward presumptuousness
or futility when he or she broadcasts general pronouncements for the future. At the
same time, we are all commissioned to judge as best we can, now and for the future,
giving fair warning if possible of where the course of decision seems to head.
Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617. See also Note, Opinion Work Product, Expert Witness Discovery, and
the Interaction of Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4)(A): Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corporation, 1985
B.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 587.
81. Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617. The plaintiff, Berkey, had requested discovery of notebooks
containing empirical data as well as defendant counsel's order and interpretation of the data.
82. Boring, 97 F.R.D. at 408.
83. Id.
84. 99 F.R.D. 95 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
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conflicted with the reasoning of the court in Boring. The plaintiff in
Baise brought a product liability action against the defendant food
manufacturer.85 The defendant filed a motion to compel discovery of
correspondence between the plaintiff's counsel and expert witnesses
retained by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's counsel objected to such dis-
covery on the ground that the correspondence contained mental im-
pressions protected by Rule 26(b)(3) work product immunity.8 6 The
court in Baise recognized the defendant's right to discover the grounds
for the plaintiff's expert's opinion under Rule 26(b)(4), but "not at
the price of invading the work product of counsel." ' "[A]ttorney
work product does not lose its special status merely because it is trans-
mitted to an expert." 88
2. Criticism of the Analogy
Assuming that FRE 612 prevails over the work product immunity
of Rule 26(b)(3), any attempt to analogize between FRE 612 and Rule
26(b)(4) must also recognize that the discovery provisions of Rule
26(b)(4) and FRE 612 were promulgated for different purposes.8 9 Rule
26(b)(4) provides for the discovery of facts and opinions so that op-
posing counsel may logically construct and prepare rebuttal questions
for cross-examination, thus aiding economy and efficiency. 9° The ad-
visory committee notes for Rule 26(b)(4) cite a California study in
support of this notion. 9' In examining the discovery and pretrial stages
of condemnation cases, the study found that "the only substitute for
discovery of experts' valuation materials is 'lengthy-and often fruit-
less-cross-examination during trial,"' and it concluded that pretrial
discovery of this information represents the most economic and effi-
cient means available to counsel. 92 Echoing this conclusion, the Su-
preme Court promulgated Rule 26(b)(4) in an effort to streamline the
judicial process.
Contrary to the intent behind Rule 26(b)(4), FRE 612 is intended
"to promote the search of credibility and memory" 9 of a witness, and
it only allows discovery of those documents having "an impact upon
85. Id. at 96.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 97.
88. Id.
89. Contra Note, supra note 80, at 587 n.71 ("While the Rule 612 cases are not exactly on
point with Rule 26(b)(4), the underlying policy and effect are the same.").
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4). See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
92. Id.
93. FED. R. EVID. 612 advisory committee's note.
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the testimony of the witness." 94 These factors, contained in the advi-
sory note to FRE 612, indicate that the sole purpose of FRE 612 is to
enable opposing counsel to thoroughly cross-examine the witness with
regard to credibility. The purpose of FRE 612, hence, differs from
that of Rule 26(b)(4). Even more importantly, unlike Rule 26(b)(4),
where in the absence of the rule the opposing counsel still has another
means of discovery, FRE 612 provides the only method by which op-
posing counsel may adequately probe the credibility of an expert wit-
ness. At least one court has relied on this factor to conclude that "it
would be unfair to deprive opposing counsel of [the] opportunity"
provided by FRE 612. 91 Thus, it becomes imperative from the stand-
point of judicial fairness that FRE 612 overcome work product immu-
nity, 96 but not so imperative for Rule 26(b)(4) to do so.
The conflict between FRE 612 and Rule 26(b)(3) seems superficially
similar to the conflict between Rule 26(b)(4) and Rule 26(b)(3) since
FRE 612 and Rule 26(b)(4) both specify certain circumstances under
which a party may obtain written material used by a witness in prepa-
ration for testifying. However, case precedent considering the conflict
between FRE 612 and Rule 26(b)(3) is of little practical value in re-
solving the tension between Rule 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4). This is so since
FRE 612 and Rule 26(b)(4) serve distinct purposes. Disregarding this
generally inapplicable line of authority removes a large portion of the-
oretical support for the assertion that the work product immunity of
Rule 26(b)(3) can be overcome by the discovery provisions of Rule
26(b)(4).91
B. In Camera Review: Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.
The most in-depth consideration of the discovery conflict between
Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) was undertaken by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1984 in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp.98 The court's resolution of the conflict and the procedure the
94. Id.
95. Al-Rowaishan Establishment Universal Trading & Agencies, Ltd. v. Beatrice Foods
Co., 92 F.R.D. 779, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
96. See generally Note, supra note 57 (the purposes of FRE 612 are accomplished without
unnecessarily sacrificing the protection of work product).
97. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y 1977), is often
cited as the seminal case to support the contention that the work product immunity of Rule
26(b)(3) must give way to the discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(4). As will be seen later, the
most glaring example of this misreliance appears in the use of Berkey as the foundation for one
party's theory in Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1984). This theory, which
asserted the primacy of Rule 26(b)(4) discovery, relied heavily on the reasoning set forth in Ber-
key and James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
98. 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984).
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court established for actually implementing its decision will now be
examined.
1. The Court's Analysis
The plaintiffs in Bogosian brought an antitrust action against a
number of defendant oil companies. 99 The plaintiffs' case relied heav-
ily on the testimony of eight expert witnesses regarding the chemical,
economic, and marketing aspects of retail gasoline sales.1°° The plain-
tiffs objected to discovery of certain documents which the counsel for
the plaintiffs had sent to the plaintiffs' expert witnesses because these
documents contained the mental impressions and legal theories of the
plaintiffs' counsel protected by the work product immunity of Rule
26(b)(3). °'0 The district court found the discovery requirements of
Rule 26(b)(4) preeminent to the qualified immunity provided in Rule
26(b)(3).102 The trial court reasoned that
because the depositions of the experts could also be used as trial
depositions, and because it was important that defendants have the
right of thorough and complete examination of the experts, the need
of the attorneys to prepare themselves before such depositions
entitled them to "all of the information which the expert had and
was given to him by counsel or otherwise."10 3
The district court issued an order compelling the plaintiffs to produce
the correspondence, and the plaintiffs filed a mandamus petition with
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 104
The Third Circuit rejected the reasoning, which had been accepted
by the Colorado district court in Boring v. Keller,05 that the exposure
of work product to an expert witness would constitute a waiver of the
work product immunity traditionally afforded such material.1°6 The
court then proceeded to consider the scope and relative strength of the
immunity provided by Rule 26(b)(3) and the discovery authorized by
Rule 26(b)(4)(A).
99. Id. at 588.
100. Id. at 589.
101. Id. at 588.
102. Id. at 590.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 588.
105. 97 F.R.D. 404, 407 (D. Colo. 1983).
106. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 593. See also Note, supra note 80, at 587 (suggesting that the
majority opinion in Bogosian simply ignored Boring).
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The court in Bogosian reviewed the history of work product immu-
nity from its roots in Hickman v. Taylor.07 The court noted that
opinion work product is to be afforded a particularly strong protec-
tion under the immunity of Rule 26(b)(3), 0 1 and emphasized the im-
portance of work product immunity in the litigation process, stating:
If attorneys are to feel free to commit to writing the mental processes
by which they sift and evaluate various possible theories on which
they will base their cases, they must feel confident that such material
will be protected from disclosure. Otherwise, the freedom of thought
essential to carefully reasoned trial preparation would be inhibited.2 9
Thus, the court indicated that it would carefully review any request
for discovery or disclosure of work product to determine if the request
violated this essential zone of work product protection.
The court in Bogosian carefully considered the language, back-
ground and emphasis of Rule 26(b)(4) and concluded that the rule was
intended to overcome prior decisions which held all information pro-
vided to an expert witness to be work product and therefore immune
from discovery under the provisions of Rule 26(b)(3)." 0 The court rec-
ognized that Rule 26(b)(4) sanctions limited discovery of facts known
and opinions held by expert witnesses."'
The court also noted that "even if interrogatories may permissibly
require disclosure that verges on mental impressions, opinions, or
conclusions, the documents themselves should be protected.""12 The
court supported its conclusion by referring to the advisory committee
notes for Rule 26(b)(3), which state:
Under [the provisions of Rules 33 and 36 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] a party and his attorney .. .may be required to
disclose, to some extent, mental impressions, opinions, or
conclusions. But documents or parts of documents containing these
matters are protected against discovery by this subdivision. Even
though a party may ultimately have to disclose in response to
interrogatories or requests to admit, he is entitled to keep
107. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
108. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 592-93.
109. Id. at 593. The court stated that the protection necessary for an attorney's legal theories
must be even greater than the "strong showing" required for the interview notes in Upjohn v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1980).
110. Bogosian, 738 F.2d at 593.
111. Id. at 595.
112. Id.
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confidential documents containing such matters prepared for internal
use.'
3
The court concluded that Rule 26(b)(4) was promulgated to facilitate
the discovery of facts known and opinions held by an expert, and not
the actual documents containing such information."14
The court in Bogosian accepted the stipulation of both parties that
the material being sought contained the mental impressions of the
plaintiff's counsel relating to legal theories of the case." 5 The court
therefore remanded the discovery process to the district court with the
request that the court examine the documents and delete, and thus
protect, any core work product of the plaintiffs' attorneys." 6 The
court reasoned that disclosure of such sanitized documents would fa-
cilitate the essential disclosure of facts known and opinions held by
the expert witness, while preventing exposure of crucial "core" attor-
ney work product protected by Rule 26(b)(3). 117
2. Criticism of the Court's Compromise in Bogosian
The court in Bogosian concluded that no genuine tension exists be-
tween Rule 26(b)(3) and Rule 26(b)(4); 15 however, the entire decision
was an effort to weigh the relative merits of each rule's provisions and
reach an equitable resolution of the procedural question. The Bogo-
sian court's suggestion that a trial judge should conduct an in camera
review of documents containing both fact and opinion work product
may appear to be an equitable and efficient compromise. However,
even limited discovery of documents which have been sanitized of all
opinion work product by an in camera examination may present an
unwarranted and potentially dangerous invasion of an attorney's
thoughts and mental processes. The selection and ordering of docu-
ments given to the expert and the relative emphasis placed on each
may reveal the attorney's strategy, even though the documents have
been expunged of work product text." 9 More importantly, however,
113. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment)).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 593.
116. Id. at 595-96. However, the court cautioned that an in camera examination of docu-
ments is normally not encouraged because the district courts are already overburdened with dis-
covery requests. Id.
117. Id. at 595.
118. Id. at 596.
119. See Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985); James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon
Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 144 (D. Del. 1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D.
613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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there are at least two major considerations which make the compro-
mise reached in Bogosian an unworkable and unwarranted intrusion
into the "zone of privacy" given to attorneys under Rule 26(b)(3).
The first consideration is that the Bogosian compromise will present
an additional burden for the already overworked federal district
courts. The federal district courts have faced a recent "explosion" in
litigation which has produced a current outstanding backlog of more
than 240,000 pending civil cases. 120 Federal district court judges in
1987 were called upon to process eighty-eight percent more new civil
filings on an average than they were in 1960.121 Both Supreme Court
justices and legal scholars acknowledge that this recent litigation ex-
plosion is "so serious that it threatens the capacity of the federal sys-
tem to function as it should.' ' 22 Many observers fear that a
continuation of this trend will result in a diminution in the consis-
tency, fairness and stability of the application of federal law. 123 In
light of the recent phenomenal increase in complex litigation in the
areas of breach of contract 24 and the "securities, commodities and
exchange category,' 1 25 which often involve documents comprising
hundreds of thousands of pages, the compromise suggested in Bogo-
sian will simply further burden the federal courts.
A second consideration presents a further problem for the in cam-
era review process suggested in Bogosian. A federal district court is
improperly equipped to perform the redaction of discovery documents
which the Bogosian compromise demands. Competent redaction
might not even protect an attorney's privileged understanding of a
case. The court in Bogosian sought to ensure the disclosure of facts
known by an expert by establishing that "a party [cannot] shield facts
from disclosure by the expedient of combining them or interlacing
them with core work product.' 1 26 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court and instructed the judge to "re-
120. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 6-7.
121. There were 221 civil cases filed per judgeship during the fiscal year 1960. 1960 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 86.
There were 416 civil cases filed per judgeship during 1987. 1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DiREc-
TOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 6.
122. Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts:
A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871,
873 (1983) (quoting DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYS-
TEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 1 (1977)).
123. Powell, Are the Federal Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370, 1371
(1982).
124. Want, The Caseload Monster in the Federal Courts, 69 A.B.A. J. 612, 614 (1983).
125. Id. at 615.
126. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984).
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dact [a document containing both facts and attorney work product
provided to an expert] so that full disclosure is made of the facts pre-
sented to the expert and considered in formulating his or her opinion,
while protection is accorded the legal theories and the attorney-expert
dialectic. ' 127 Yet, federal district courts are poorly equipped to per-
form such editing in a manner which would adequately identify and
protect an attorney's "core" work product. The support staff for a
federal district court, almost always unfamiliar with the research
methods of a particular attorney, cannot be expected to separate accu-
rately pure factual information from research which attempts to artic-
ulate and organize the opinions, theories, and conclusions of counsel
involved in complex litigation. Further, as argued in Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 2 and James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon
Co. ,129 when cases require extensive document discovery the disclosure
of the specific documents which an attorney selects to provide to his
expert "could not help but reveal important aspects of [the attorney's]
understanding of the case."' 130 Therefore, disclosure of documents ed-
ited through the process of in camera review as suggested in Bogosian
will still constitute a serious intrusion into the protected opinions,
conclusions and legal theories of counsel involved in litigation.
A review of the advisory notes pertaining to the drafting and adop-
tion of Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) reveals further evidence that Rule
26(b)(4) discovery will not justify the discovery of documents which
are protected by Rule 26(b)(3). The advisory committee notes for the
1970 amendment to Rule 26(b)(3) specifically state that the mental im-
pressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney are
subject to special protection.' 3' The committee intended that Rule
26(b)(3) should codify post-Hickman decisions which had "steadfastly
safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers' mental impressions and le-
gal theories.' ' 3 2 While the committee recognized that the discovery
provisions of Rules 26(b)(4), 33 and 36 may force counsel to reveal
some of its impressions, conclusions and opinions in interrogatory an-
127. Id.
128. 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
129. 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del. 1982).
130. Id. at 144. See also Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 616. Because of this danger, the compromise
solution employed in North Carolina Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,
108 F.R.D. 283 (M.D.N.C. 1985), where the attorney redacted the work product material, is just
as unpalatable as the in camera procedure.
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment). See, e.g., Secu-
rities and Exch. Comm'n. v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 92 F.R.D. 65, 66 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
See also Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et. Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1974); Radowich v. United States Attorney Dist. of Md., 501 F. Supp. 284
(D. Md. 1980), rev'don other grounds, 658 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1981).
132. FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment).
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swers, the notes provide that "documents or parts of documents con-
taining these matters are protected against discovery."33
Although the advisory committee notes for Rule 26(b)(3) do state
that "[in enforcing [the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3)],
the courts will sometimes find it necessary to order disclosure of a
document but with portions deleted,'1 3 4 this statement is not disposi-
tive when read in the context of the notes as a whole. It is particularly
significant that the advisory committee indicated that the procedure of
deleting work product from a document prior to disclosure would be a
means not of furthering the discovery provisions of Rule 26(b)(4), but
of "enforcing" the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3). 135 Where
practice and experience indicate that such a process will not ade-
quately protect the work product privilege, this process would no
longer be a useful method for enforcing the provisions of Rule
26(b)(3). Thus, this statement in the notes does not necessarily estab-
lish that the disclosure of documents purportedly expunged of work
product is appropriate.
The advisory notes for Rule 26(b)(4) are in accord with the pro-
nouncements of the advisory committee notes for Rule 26(b)(3). The
committee noted that "[s]ubsection (b)(4)(A) deals with discovery of
information obtained by or through experts who will be called as wit-
nesses at trial.1136 The notes for Rule 26 (b)(4) recognize that:
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance
preparation. The lawyer . . . frequently cannot anticipate the
particular approach his adversary's expert will take .... Effective
rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side. If the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, then
the narrowing of issues and elimination of surprise which discovery
normally produces are frustrated.
137
Despite this explicit recognition of the importance of discovery of
facts and opinions held by an expert, the advisory committee notes do
not authorize or indicate any intent to expose documents containing
opinion work product to Rule 26(b)(4) discovery. A review of the ad-
visory committee notes for both Rule 26(b)(3) and Rule 26(b)(4)
clearly indicates that while the drafters did envision some limited dis-
covery of attorneys' mental impressions through routine interrogatory
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (1970 amendment) (emphasis added).
137. Id. (emphasis added).
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discovery, they did not intend to formulate Rule 26(b)(4) as a tool for
overcoming the work product immunity of Rule 26(b)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
An examination of the cases dealing with the conflict between Rules
26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) and the advisory committee notes for each rule
suggests that Rule 26(b)(4) does not authorize discovery of documents
containing attorney work product. Nonetheless, some courts, analo-
gizing Rule 26(b)(4) to FRE 612, hold otherwise, and the court in Bo-
gosian has proposed that such documents should be discoverable after
the trial court has edited all opinion work product from the docu-
ments through an in camera review of material. As has been shown,
both of these positions are illogical and inequitable.
Cases analogizing the conflict between Rule 26(b)(3) and FRE 612
with the conflict between Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) are ill-founded
because of the differing purposes of Rule 26(b)(4) and FRE 612. The
Supreme Court promulgated the two rules for different reasons. The
purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) was to provide opposing counsel with an eco-
nomic and efficient alternative for gaining information. Federal Rule
of Evidence 612, on the other hand, provides opposing counsel with
the only route available to obtain information necessary for a thor-
ough cross-examination on the issue of witness credibility. This latter
purpose presents a strong argument for resolving the conflict between
Rule 26(b)(3) and FRE 612 in favor of FRE 612. The purpose associ-
ated with Rule 26(b)(4), however, is much less compelling, thus mak-
ing an analogy between the two conflicts illogical.
As noted earlier, the court in Bogosian sought to ensure that all
parties in a given case would have full and unrestricted access to the
facts provided to another party's expert. If this access is the primary
purpose of the court's decision, the compromise plan of in camera
review of documents is unnecessary. Full and fair responses to the in-
terrogatory process already provided for by Rule 26(b)(4) will ade-
quately provide other parties with the necessary factual material
without involving the trial court in the burdensome and potentially
dangerous task of editing and releasing actual documents.
While the court in Bogosian correctly recognized the importance of
the work product immunity provided by Rule 26(b)(3), 3 8 the decision,
138. See Note, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of Attorney Opinion
Work Product Provided to an Expert Witness, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1159, 1168 (1985) ("opinion
work product-shielded by Rule 26(b)(3)-would not be discoverable under Rule 26(b)(4)"). But
see Note, supra note 80, at 586 ("The absolute protection standard advanced in Bogosian is
unsatisfactory because cases may arise involving counsel unduly influencing an expert.").
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nonetheless, failed to recognize the full range of ramifications and
dangers encompassed by its suggestion of disclosure of documents
through in camera review. What is currently needed is a clear judicial
statement that the importance of Rule 26(b)(3) work product immu-
nity is so great that any discovery of work product must be strictly
limited to the factual information which is already obtainable through
Rule 26(b)(4) interrogatories.13 9 This resolution of the conflict between
Rules 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) would fulfill the intent of the rules, and
would provide attorneys with certainty and stability as to which mate-
rials used in preparing experts would be subject to discovery by the
opposing party.
139. Cf. Note, Discovery of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by an Expert Witness, 85
COLUM. "L. REv. 812 (1985). Although this Note does not propose that courts restrict discovery
under Rule 26(b)(4)(A) to the interrogatory process, it does conclude that "[clourts must read
Rule 26(b)(3) together with Rule 26(b)(4) and require a showing of substantial need and undue
hardship before ordering production of attorney work product shown to an expert witness." Id.
at 835 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the need for such a statement is highlighted when one considers the prevailing
attitude toward the Rule 26(b)(4)(A) interrogatory process among practitioners. Professor Gra-
ham sent out questionnaires to practitioners and judges around the country and reached the
following conclusion:
The results of the survey indicate that the actual practice of discovery of expert
witnesses expected to be called at trial varies widely from the two-step procedure of
Rule 26(b)(4)(A). The interogatory (sic) overwhelmingly is recognized as a totally un-
satisfactory method of providing adequate preparation for cross-examination and re-
buttal. In practice, full discovery is the rule . ...
Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part
Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169, 172.
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